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This article presents a new theoretical perspective on the diversionary use of force. 
Players are partitioned into groups and choose how to allocate their resources 
to production, fighting against other groups, and fighting internally. The model 
gives a rationalist explanation of the group cohesion effect: when there is a lot of 
fighting between groups, there is less internal fighting. In equilibrium, players choose 
sufficiently high external conflict in order to avoid internal conflict. In contrast with 
the existing literature, this diversionary use of force takes place even though there 
is no asymmetric or incomplete information. 
KEYWORDS: diversion, conflict, group cohesion effect, war 
“The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war 
towards the other-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with  
outsiders are what make peace inside.” (Sumner, 1906: 12) 
1. Introduction
The idea of diversionary wars figures prominently in many historical and political 
writings. Yet, its viability is debated, both empirically and theoretically. This article 
presents a new theoretical perspective on the diversionary use of force. We formalize 
the idea that diversionary wars are based on the so-called “group cohesion effect” 
that external conflict mitigates internal conflict, which is nicely expressed by William 
Sumner in our opening quote. 
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Our model captures four main ideas. (i) Property is insecure: by investing 
resources in guns, it is possible to appropriate output from others. Moreover, 
players are partitioned into groups, where a group may represent a country or an 
ethnic group. Players have three activities: fighting against the outsiders, fighting 
against the insiders, and production. (ii) Players have limited resources. For 
example, resources used for production cannot be used for fighting, which is the 
usual trade-off between guns and butter. In addition, resources used for internal 
fighting cannot simultaneously be used against the outsiders and vice versa. (iii) 
Winning against insiders does not help if one loses against the outsiders—and vice 
versa. (iv) Decisions on external conflict are taken by a different type of decision-
making process than decisions on internal conflict. Decisions on external conflict 
are collective decisions, taken by some political process within each group. In 
contrast, decisions about production and internal conflict—say, how hard to work, 
and whether or not to join a rebellion—are typically taken individually. 
We study a two-stage model where in the first stage, groups decide how much to 
invest into fighting against the other groups. Investing more in the external conflict 
increases the group’s share of total output. However, it also implies that the 
group’s members have fewer resources available in the second stage. In stage 2, 
players individually decide how to allocate their remaining resources to internal 
fighting and production. Here, each player faces the classic trade-off between guns 
and butter: investing more into internal fighting increases the player’s share, but 
has the opportunity cost of decreasing total output, since the resources invested in 
internal fighting can no longer be used for production. The equilibrium amount of 
internal fighting depends crucially on the tightness of the budget constraints. In 
particular, if players have few resources available in stage 2, there will be only little 
or no internal fighting in stage 2. 
Now consider the incentives of a group in stage 1. Investing into external 
fighting increases the share of the group at the expense of the other groups. 
However, any resources invested into external fighting can no longer be used for 
production or internal fighting. Thus the group will take into account that its 
decision in stage 1 has an impact on the tightness of the budget constraints in stage 
2, and thereby on the equilibrium amount of internal fighting. The incentives to 
fight against the other groups thus depend, inter alia, on the effect of tighter 
budgets in stage 2. More external fighting could lead to less production, in which 
case there is a trade-off between external fighting and production. However, if 
more external fighting only reduces internal fighting, without decreasing 
production, then spending on external fighting increases the group’s share without 
decreasing output, and therefore is clearly beneficial for the group. 
We show that in our model, in equilibrium, groups always spend a sufficient 
amount on external fighting such that no internal fighting occurs. The individuals 
within a group have two benefits from this: they are no longer wasting resources 
in fighting internally, and by fighting the outsiders they increase their share at the 
expense of the other groups. Of course, from the perspective of all individuals, 
having no conflict at all would be even better; but if property is insecure, this is not 
an equilibrium. The intensity of external conflict is driven by the consideration that 
internal conflict should be avoided. A higher insecurity of property within groups, 
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which ceteris paribus would imply higher incentives to fight internally, thus only 
leads to more external conflict. 
As a robustness check, we also consider the case where all decisions are taken 
individually, including decisions about external conflict. We show that for a large 
range of parameters the same conclusions emerge. If the incentives to fight 
internally are strong and the incentives to fight externally comparatively small, 
however, there will be internal fighting on the equilibrium path. Thus our article 
predicts that internal fighting will occur if two conditions are met: the insecurity of 
property within groups is high, and institutions are weak so that groups are unable 
to enforce decisions on external conflict. 
Many historians argue that external wars were started out of consideration to 
internal conflict. For example, Kennedy (2000: 57) writes about the Great Arab 
Conquest, which started in the 7th century, that “... the leadership had no choice 
but to direct the frenetic energies of the Bedouin against the Roman and Sasanian 
empires. The only way of avoiding an implosion was to direct the Muslim against 
the non-Muslim world.” This example nicely fits our theoretical model—the 
leadership started external conquest, forseeing that otherwise internal conflict 
would arise. Other cases include the behavior of the military Junta in Argentina in 
the Falklands/Malvinas War (Levy and Vakili, 1992) or the German elites prior to 
World War I (Wehler, 1973; Joll, 1984). Moreover, large-scale ethnic violence is 
often seen as at least partially driven by political fighting within the elite of one 
ethnic group. For example, reviewing several case studies on inter-ethnic conflict, 
Fearon and Laitin (2000: 864) conclude that “the leader’s motivation to ‘play the 
ethnic card’ emerges out of political fighting within the leader’s ethnic group”. 
Cases in point include the genocide in Rwanda (Prunier, 1995; see also Hintjens, 
1999), Sudan (Deng, 1995), and the Balkans (Woodward, 1995). 
With our model, we also explicitly address several theoretical objections to the 
idea of diversionary wars. Blainey (1973) argues that any resources used in a war 
against outsiders could also be used to crush internal discord. We show that, 
nevertheless, players can be rational in starting a war against outsiders. Levy (1989, 
1998) critically surveys the literature and asks for a more solid theory explicitly 
linking diversionary wars with the group cohesion effect. In this article, we try to 
answer his request by exposing a formal model that captures both the group 
cohesion effect and diversionary wars. Fearon and Laitin (2000) wonder why the 
public should follow if political leaders start a diversionary war. In our model, 
all individuals are perfectly rational and there is complete information but, 
nevertheless, individuals have an incentive to follow if some leader tries a 
diversionary tactic. This is in line with empirical observations: Fearon and Laitin 
(2000) conclude, based on their review of several case studies from diversionary 
conflict in inter-ethnic relations, that individuals have private benefits from 
following incitements to diversionary wars. For example, Woodward (1995: 249) 
argues that the war in Bosnia became, for many of the participants who sustained 
the violence, a “rare opportunity for enrichment, through theft and smuggling, in 
a period of economic decline. Early pictures in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
show soldiers looting VCRs and stereos, urban furniture and appliances, and 
foreign automobiles such as BMWs”. Similarly, Prunier (1995) attributes the 
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genocide in Rwanda partially to internal fighting between moderate and extremist 
Hutu groups, and states that—in addition to indoctrination and obedience— 
“[t]here was of course also an element of material interest in the killings [...]. The 
killers looted household belongings and slaughtered the cattle. Meat became very 
cheap, and grand feasts were held” (p. 248). 
Existing formal models of diversionary wars usually rely on some kind of 
incomplete information. Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001), Smith (1996), and 
Chapman and Reiter (2004) explain the occurrence of diversionary wars by the 
voters’ incomplete information about the abilities of a leader. In contrast, we 
assume complete information and nevertheless find that diversionary wars 
are possible. Technically, our article is most closely related to the literature on the 
economics of conflict. Important contributions include Skaperdas (1992), Grossman 
(1991, 1994), and Hirschleifer (2001). See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a 
survey. Münster (2007) studies simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts with a 
ratio form conflict technology. In contrast, we assume a logistic contest success 
function, which fits some stylized facts about warfare (see Hirshleifer, 1991). 
Moreover, unlike Münster (2007), we look at collective decisions concerning 
external conflict and in particular at the diversionary motive for external wars. A 
further difference is that in our model, the collective decisions on external conflict 
are taken before the individual decisions on internal conflict and production, 
which is more appropriate for modeling collective decisions on external conflict. 
Finally, we do not study the coalition formation of groups and group dynamics. See 
Garfinkel (2004a,b) on the formation of groups when there is a possibility of both 
internal and external conflict. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and 
section 3 studies its equilibria. Here we expose the group cohesion effect and 
the diversionary use of force. As a robustness check, section 4 looks at the case 
where decisions on external conflicts are taken individually. Section 5 concludes. 
The appendix collects most of the proofs. 
2. The Model
There are n identical individuals who are divided into G groups of equal size 
m = n/G. Each individual is endowed with one unit of a resource, which can be 
used for three types of activities: production, external conflict (fighting against 
the outsiders), and internal conflict (fighting within one’s own group). The amount 
of external conflict is chosen collectively by some political process. Since individu-
als are identical, members of a given group prefer the same amount of external 
conflict, given the behavior of competing groups, and we assume that this amount is 
chosen. Decisions on external fighting are made in the first stage of the game, before 
individuals decide how to allocate their remaining resources to internal fighting 
and production. Note that this time structure is consistent with, for example, what 
Kennedy (2007) writes about the Great Arab Conquest: when deciding on external 
conflict, groups take into account their likely impact on internal conflict. Denote 
production by individual i in group g by eig, internal fighting by xig, and the per capita 
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amount of external fighting chosen by group g by yg. The resource constraint of the 
individual i in group g is1 
eig + xig + yg = 1.
Thus, we have the following two-stage game: 
1. Each group decides on the amount yg that each group member has to put into 
the external conflict. 
2. After observing all the decisions taken in stage 1, individuals simultaneously 
and independently decide how to allocate their remaining resources to 
production and internal fighting. 















where f is a production function satisfying f (0) = 0 and f ′ (z) > 0 for all z ≥ 0 . In 
addition, we assume that f is strictly log-concave. This is just a weak assumption: all 
concave functions, for example, are also log-concave. Log-concavity ensures that 
f ′ (z) /f (z) is strictly decreasing in z. Since this ratio plays a major role in the 
analysis that follows, we introduce the notation ø (z): = f ′ (z) /f (z) for convenience. 
The distribution of output depends on the fighting efforts. The share of output 
that goes to group g is denoted by pg and is assumed to be a function of all the 
inter-group fighting activities. Thus, the amount that group g gets is pqq. From 
that amount, individual i in group g gets the share rig which depends on the 
intra-group fighting activities of the members of group g. The payoff of individual 
i in group g is 
uig = rig pgq.
In all models of conflict, one important modeling choice concerns the technology 
of conflict. The two most commonly studied technologies are the ratio form and the 
logistic technology of conflict. These two technologies have an axiomatic foundation 
by Skaperdas (1996), which can be extended to group contests (Münster, 2009). We 
focus on the logistic technology of conflict, since it fits some stylized facts about 
1 This resource constraint can, for example, be interpreted as a constraint on time. We normal-
ize the resources available to an individual to 1. Therefore, xig (and similarly yig and eig) can 
also be thought of as the fraction of resources invested in internal fighting (external fighting 
and production, respectively).
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The parameter a > 0 describes the decisiveness of the intra-group contest. If a 
is small, the fighting efforts will have little influence on the division of out-
put, whereas if a → ∞ then small differences in fighting efforts are decisive. We 
think of a being determined by both technological factors (for example, police 
technology) and institutional factors pertaining to the security of property within 
















The parameter b > 0  describes the decisiveness of the inter-group contest and a 
smaller b  implies that fighting effort will have less influence on the division of 
output between groups. For example, a higher importance of international institutions 
and methods of peaceful international conflict resolution would mean that there 
is a lower incentive to engage in international fighting, which can be captured by a 
lower b  in our model. Like a , this is determined by technological and institutional 
factors. However, b  may differ from a  since both the technology and the relevant 
institutions differ in contests between groups from those in contests within groups. 
For example, a civil war (an intra-group conflict) is often fought with small arms, 
while in an international war (an inter-group conflict) heavy weapons like aircraft 
carriers may also be used. 
3. The Diversionary Use of Force
We are interested in the subgame perfect equilibria and solve the game by back-
ward induction. Substitute the budget constraints into the objective function to get 















∑ ∑1 1 1 . In the second stage, individuals choose how 
to allocate their remaining resources between internal fighting and production. In 
their choices they are constrained by the amount of resources that has already been 
devoted to the external conflict in the first stage. Denote the objective function of 
individual i  in group g  in the second stage by vig ;  and let x ig−  denote the vector 
of all the internal fighting efforts except xig . In stage 2, individual i  in group g  
chooses xig  to maximize 
2 See Hirshleifer (2000) for further discussion of technologies of conflict. The logistic 
technology of conflict has also been used in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996), Baik (1998), 
and Anderton (2000).
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on May 13, 2015cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Münster & Staal: War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside
97
 
v x x y y p
ax
ax




































subject to 0 1≤ ≤ −x yig g . 
It is straightforward to show that vig  is log-concave in xig . Moreover, the constraint 
set is convex. It follows that, in a solution, one of the following first-order conditions 

































Moreover, if one of these conditions holds, this is sufficient for a maximum. Line 
(2) concerns the case where the opportunity costs of internal fighting in terms of 
foregone production are prohibitively high and, thus, there is no internal fighting. 
Line (3) describes the case where there is an interior solution, where the amount 
of internal fighting is determined by the trade-off between internal fighting and 
production. Finally, the constraint that x yig g≤ −1  might be binding; line (4) takes 
this into account. 

































































where φ z f z f z( ) = ( ) / ( )′ . Line (5) and the first-order conditions (2)–(4) imply 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 Any equilibrium of the second stage is within-group symmetric: all players 
i m= ,...,1  in a given group k  choose the same x xik k= . 
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If a  is below a certain threshold, which depends on the choices in the first stage, 
there is no internal fighting and only production in stage 2. Lemma 2 specifies this. 
On the other hand, lemma 3 below shows that, if a  is bigger than the threshold, 
there is internal conflict. 
Lemma 2 If 
















then there exists a unique equilibrium of the subgames in stage 2 with xig = 0  for all 





























To gain some intuition, observe that (7) is likely to hold if there has been a lot of 
external fighting in stage 1. Then there are few resources left over in stage 2. Even 
if all the remaining resources are allocated to production, the marginal incentives 
to produce are higher than the marginal incentives to engage in internal conflict. 
Thus, there is no internal fighting. 
Lemma 3 If inequality (7) does not hold, then in any equilibrium of the subgames 
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Lemma 3 describes the case where there was relatively little fighting in the first 
stage. Here, if all the remaining resources were allocated to production, the marginal 
incentives to fight internally would be higher than the marginal incentives to produce. 
Thus, there is some internal fighting in equilibrium, the amount being determined 
by the trade-off between internal fighting and production. Since expression (9) only 
determines the total amount of internal fighting, the equilibrium will typically be 
not unique. All equilibria, however, are payoff equivalent. 
An interesting feature of the equilibrium utilities of the subgames in the second 
stage is that, in the case with internal fighting (lemma 3), equilibrium production 
does not depend on the choices made in the first stage. If there are more resources 
left over from the first stage, this simply leads to more internal conflict in the 
second stage. Conversely, increasing yg  gives group g  a higher share pg  of output 
without decreasing production. Of course this is no longer true once there is so 
much external fighting in stage 1 that (7) holds. Taken together, lemmas 2 and 3 
offer a rationalist explanation of the group cohesion effect: when there is more 
external fighting, there will be less internal fighting. 
We now consider the first stage. 
Proposition 1 In any subgame perfect equilibrium, there is sufficient external fighting 
such that there is no internal fighting on the equilibrium path. 
Proof Suppose to the contrary that there is internal fighting on the equilibrium 
path in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Denote the choices made in stage 1 in that 




, ..., . By lemmas 2 and 3, we have 




















































Now suppose that instead of choosing yg
∗ ,  group g  deviates to choose a higher amount 
of external fighting yg
∗ + ε  in stage 1, where ε > 0  is sufficiently small such that
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which is strictly higher than the supposed equilibrium utility given in (11). 
Hence, all individuals in group g  would prefer to choose a higher amount of 
external fighting in stage 1. This shows that there can be no internal fighting on 
the equilibrium path. 






∑ 1  is sufficiently small. Suppose this were the case and consider the 
decisions in stage 1. By lemma 3 the utility of each group g  is strictly increasing 
in yg , as can be seen directly from equation (10). So each group would have an 
incentive to increase external fighting, at least up to the point where internal 
fighting ceases. 
To analyze the equilibrium decisions on external conflict, the following definition 
of four separate cases is useful. 
Definition 1 Let case NO be defined by 






( ) ≥ − , −
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Definition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The next proposition analyzes the equilib-
rium decisions at the first stage. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium where 
y y yG1 = ... = =: .
Proposition 2 In the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, the choices of external 






= −( )( ).1 1φ  (12)
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= −( )( ).1 1φ  (13)
Proposition 2 shows that in case NO (where both a  and b  are relatively small) there 
will be no conflict at all. In case INTER (where b  is relatively big), the equilibrium 
amount of inter-group conflict will be determined by a trade-off between inter-
group fighting and production. Given this amount of inter-group fighting, there is no 
internal conflict in stage 2. The case INTRA (where a  is relatively big) is different, 
however. In this case, the equilibrium amount of external conflict is determined by 





∑ 1  
is determined such that (7) holds with equality. How much external fighting occurs 
in case INTRA thus depends on the technology of internal conflict: 
Corollary 1 In case INTRA, an increase in internal insecurity a  leads to more exter-
nal fighting y , while changes in external insecurity b  do not affect the amount of 
external fighting. 
4. Individual Decisions on External Conflict
In this section, we study what happens if decisions on external conflict are taken 










Figure 1. Here we illustrate the cases given in definition 1. The bold line corresponds to 
case SPECIAL
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Let yig  denote the per capita amount of external fighting chosen by individual i  in 
group g . There are two stages: 
1. Individuals simultaneously and independently choose yig ∈ ,[ ]0 1 , i n= ,...,1 , 
g G= ,...,1 . 
2. After observing all choices at the first stage, individuals simultaneously and 




0 1 . 






















If y yjk k=  for all groups k  and all j  in group k , this is exactly equal to (1) above. 
In all other respects, the model is the same as above. 















then the equilibrium path with collective decisions on external conflict is also an 
equilibrium path with individual decisions on external conflict. 
Proposition 3 is a statement on the equilibrium path. The equilibria cannot be the 
same for the trivial reason that a strategy in the model with collective decisions is a 
different mathematical object than a strategy in the model with individual decisions. 
Proposition 3, however, shows that all observable behavior will be the same for a 
wide range of parameters.3 


















The left-hand side of (15) equals the amount of external conflict chosen in stage 
1 according to (12). If inequality (15) holds, the amount of external conflict is not 
extremely big. This means that, after an attempt to free-ride, the resources left over 
from stage 1 cannot differ too much. Hence, there exists an interior equilibrium 
in stage 2, where the players’ shares within their groups are equal. A player who 
attempts to free-ride in the first stage has more resources available than the other 
players in stage 2. But he does not attain a higher utility: he ends up doing more 
3It is straightforward to show that condition (14) is always satisfied unless more than 80% of 
the resources are invested in fighting.
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production in stage 2, but does not gain anything in terms of a higher share within his 
group. This is a paradox of power in the sense of Hirshleifer (1991). Total output is 
determined by the trade-off between internal fighting and production, and is thus the 
same as if there had been no deviation. So the deviation does not bring any benefit. 
Proposition 3 shows that the possibility of diversionary wars does not crucially 
depend on the assumption that groups can force their members to invest a certain 
amount in external fighting. Rather, diversionary wars are possible even when all 
decisions are taken individually and noncooperatively. However, the similarity 
between the individual and collective decisions on external conflict breaks down 
if the incentives for internal fighting are extremely high. 
Remark 1 Consider case INTRA. If a  is sufficiently big, the equilibrium path with 
collective decisions on external conflict is not an equilibrium path with individual 
decisions on external conflict. 
Therefore, the model predicts internal fighting whenever two conditions are met: 
property is very insecure within groups, and groups cannot enforce external fighting. 
In contrast to case INTRA, the similarity between the two models holds without 
further assumptions in the other cases. 
Proposition 4 In cases NO, INTER, and SPECIAL, the equilibrium path with indi-
vidual decisions on external conflict is identical to the equilibrium path with collective 
decisions on external conflict. 
This result is related to Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) who note the absence of 
a free-rider problem in a contest between two groups. In a classic free-rider prob-
lem, all share the benefits of some activities, but the costs are borne individually. 
In contrast, in the model considered here the cost of fighting against outsiders is 
foregone production and is thus borne by all players as well. If one player increases 
her yig , this not only has a positive externality on her fellow group members (pg  is 
higher), but also a negative externality (q  is lower). This explains the absence of a 
free-rider problem. 
5. Conclusion
This article studies the interdependence of internal conflict, external conflict, and 
production. We set up a model of conflict and appropriation where players are par-
titioned in groups and can engage in appropriation both against the other groups 
and within their own group. We distinguish between a technology of external 
conflict, which describes how easy or difficult it is to take from the other groups, and 
a technology of internal conflict, which describes the possibilities for appropriation 
within groups. These technologies may differ because the methods used in the two 
types of conflicts, as well as the institutions for conflict resolution, differ. 
Decisions about external conflict are often taken by some political process. We 
therefore study collective decisions, where groups decide on the amount of 
resources that each group member has to devote to the external conflict, before 
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individuals choose how to allocate their remaining resources to production and 
internal conflict. Groups choose sufficiently high external conflict in order to avoid 
internal conflict. Thus, there is no internal fighting on the equilibrium path. If 
property gets more insecure within groups, and hence incentives to start fighting 
internally are high, this only leads to more external fighting. That remains true even 
when groups cannot gain much from the other groups by fighting against them. In 
an extension we show that for a large range of parameter values similar results 
emerge when decisions on external fighting are taken individually. However, when 
property or power is very insecure within groups, and institutions are weak so that 
groups cannot force their members to invest resources into fighting against the 
outsiders, the model predicts that there will be internal fighting. 
A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose, to the contrary, that there are two individuals in the same 
group who choose different amounts of internal fighting. Without loss of generality, 
suppose 0 11 2≤ < ≤ −x x yg g g . Since x yg g1 1< − , from the first-order condition for 
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On the other hand, since 0 2< x g , from the first-order conditions for player 2 (lines 
(3) and (4)) we get 











































∑ ∑≤1 2exp exp  or x xg g1 2≥ , a 
contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 2 Existence: The condition of the lemma (inequality (7)) implies 
that the first-order condition (2) for the case with no internal fighting holds for all 
individuals. Uniqueness: Suppose there exists an equilibrium where xig > 0  for some 







0 . This contradicts the first-order conditions (2)–(4). Payoffs follow by inserting. 
Proof of Lemma 3 Existence: By (6), if equation (9) holds, we have ∂ / ∂ =v xig ig 0.  It 
remains to show that there exist x xG1, ...,  such that 0 1≤ ≤ −x yg g  for g G= ,...,1  
and such that equation (9) holds. Note that if x yg g= −1  for all g G= , ...,1  we have 
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On the other hand, if xg = 0  for all g G= ,...,1  we have 

























since by assumption inequality (7) does not hold. By continuity of φ , there thus exist 
x xG1, ...,  such that 0 1≤ ≤ −x yg g  for g G= ,...,1  and such that equation (9) holds. 
This completes the existence proof. 
Uniqueness: Because of lemma 1 we only have to consider within-group symmetric 
equilibria. Equation (9) is equivalent to 
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To ease notation, let X n m y a m m
k
G
k:= − − − /
=
−∑ 1 1 1φ ( ( ) )  denote the right-hand 
side of (16). Note that X > 0  since, by assumption, (7) does not hold. Using the 





∑ =1 . Moreover, by (6), (9) is 












∑ <1  we have ∂∂ >vxigig 0  by (6). Then the first order condition implies 
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∑ <1 .  Second, if m x XkG k=∑ <1  we have ∂∂ <vxigig 0 . Then the first-




∑ = <1 0 , 
contradiction. Hence, there are no equilibria where (9) does not hold. Payoffs 
follow from inserting. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Case NO Since φ n a m m( ) ≥ −( ) /1 , inequality (7) holds 
for any possible y yG1, ..., . Hence in the second stage we have xig = 0  for all i  and 
g,  no matter what was chosen in stage 1. Therefore in stage 1 the groups choose 












































y yG1 0 2
1 1
0
since by definition of case NO, b G G n−( ) / ≤ ( )1 φ . Since uig  is log-concave, it follows 
that there is an equilibrium where y yG1 0= ... = = . Moreover, it is straightforward 
to show that the equilibrium is unique. 
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1 11φ  (17)
Existence: If all groups choose y yg =  given in (17), then in stage 2 xig = 0  for all i  
and g.  Fix all y y yG2 = ... = =  and think of ui1  as a function of y1 . Choosing a y y1 <  
leads to internal conflict in stage 2, and is thus never optimal—in this range ui1  is 
strictly increasing in y1  (see line (10) in lemma 3). On the other hand, if y y1 1∈ ,[ ]  
there is no internal fighting. In this range, the objective function ui1  is 
 u
bmy
bmy G bmy m
















(see line (8)). We will show that ui1  is strictly decreasing in y1  for all y y1 > . 
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where the second inequality is from (INTRA), and the third inequality is from 




n G my my
−( ) ( )













which by (18) is equivalent to ∂ / ∂ <u yi1 1 0 . 
Uniqueness: Here we argue that there is no symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium 




























−( )( ) > >− − . Hence each group would gain from choosing 
a slightly lower yg —this still leads to zero internal conflict in the second stage, and 
the lower share of group g  is outweighed by the corresponding increase in output. 
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Case INTER Existence: Equation (13) defines a unique y∈ ,( )0 1 .  If y y yG1 = ... = =  
then we have xig = 0  for all i and g. Fix all y yg = ,  g G= ,...,2  and think of ui1  as 
a function of y1 . Choosing a y1  such that there is internal fighting can never be 
optimal. Moreover, among the range where there is no internal fighting, uig  is a 
strictly log-concave objective function to be maximized over a convex set, and at 
the proposed value the derivative of the objective function is zero. 
Uniqueness: Here we argue that there is no symmetric subgame perfect 
equilibrium where y  is not given by equation (13). Suppose that y bn
G
G< − ( )− −1 1 1 1φ , 
then each group would profit from increasing yg . On the other hand, if 
y bn
G
G> − ( )− −1 1 1 1φ , then each group would profit from decreasing its yg .  
Case SPECIAL Similar to case INTER. 
Proof of Proposition 3 In stage 2, players are maximizing a continuous and qua-
siconcave objective function over a compact interval. By standard arguments, an 
equilibrium exists in all subgames. 












1 11φ  (19)
in the first stage, then in the second stage all players have the same amount of 
resources left, and hence the analysis of the second stage of the model with collec-
tive decisions on external conflict applies. Thus, in stage 2 players have no incentive 
to deviate. 
This implies that, in order to show existence of a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium with the desired properties, it is enough to analyze subgames that can 
be reached by a unilateral deviation in the first stage. Suppose all players except 
player i = 1 in group g = 1  choose y yjk =  in stage 1. We want to show that player 
i = 1 in group g = 1  has no incentive to deviate. 
Consider a deviation to some y y11 > . Then, in the resulting subgame in stage 2 
there is only production and zero internal fighting. The benefit of the deviation is 
a higher share p1  for one’s own group. However, it follows from the definition of 
case INTRA and (19) that this gain does not outweigh forgone production. 
Thus, consider a deviation to some y y11 < . Then there is an equilibrium of the 
resulting subgame in stage 2 with the following properties: all players choose the 
same amount of internal fighting x  given by 
 φ n n y y nx a
m
m
− −( ) − −( ) = − ,1 111  (20)
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To show this, we only have to show that there exists x y∈ , −[ ]0 1  such that (20) holds. 
To see that such an x  exists, note that if x = 0 , we have 
 n n y y nx n n y y n ny− −( ) − − = − −( ) − ≥ −1 111 11
since y y11 < . Thus φ φn n y y nx n y a
m
m− −( ) − −( ) ≤ −( )( ) = −1 111 1 . On the other hand, 
if x y= −1 , then 
 n n y y nx n n y y n y
n n y n y y n y
− −( ) − − = − −( ) − − −( )





The last inequality is by (15) (see the discussion of condition (15) in the main text). 
Thus, if x y= −1 , then φ φn n y y nx n y a mm− −( ) − −( ) ≥ −( )( ) = −1 111 1 . By continuity 
of φ , it follows that there exists an x y∈ , −[ ]0 1  such that (20) holds. 
Now suppose that, after a deviation to a lower y11 , the players play the 
equilibrium of stage 2 just described. Then player 1  in group 1  gets an overall 
utility which is lower than if he had not deviated: r m11 1= / , q  is the same as 
without a deviation, but p1  is lower. 
Proof of Remark 1 Consider case INTRA, fix some b , and let a → ∞ . Then, on the 


















since e y a mm= − = ( ) →− −1 01 1φ . Now consider a deviation to y11 0=  and x11 12= . 
The worst that could happen to the deviating player is that no one else produces in 
stage 2. Thus, his utility u  is bigger or equal to 
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Thus, for sufficiently high a, the deviation gives a higher utility. 
Proof of Proposition 4 We only have to consider deviations in the first stage. 
Consider player i = 1 in group g = 1 . Deviating to a higher amount of external 
fighting does not pay off: in the resulting subgame there is only production, and 
the gain in p1  does not outweigh forgone production. Thus, consider a deviation 
to a lower y11 . This may have a strategic effect on the choices of the other players 
in the second stage. For the deviating player, the best that could possibly happen is 
that the other players use their remaining resources only for production in stage 2, 
as on the proposed equilibrium path. Thus, the strategic effect can never be benefi-
cial for the deviating player. Moreover, since at the proposed equilibrium values, 
∂ / ∂ ≥ ∂ / ∂ ≥ ∂ / ∂u e u y u x11 11 11 11 11 11  the deviation does not pay off, even if it has no 
influence in the second-stage choices of the other players. 
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